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PREFACE 
I offer here my inadequate but very sincere appreciation to 
Dro Harry M. Campbell, Dro D. S. Berkeley, and Dr. John Milstead; all 
have been extremely kind and generous in their assistanceo It was 
largely from ideas presented by Dr. Campbell and Dr. Berkeley in class-
room lectures that this thesis originated and developed. And I am 
very grateful for their unfailing helpfulness and cooperation through-
out the writing of the paper. 
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MELVILLE'S SPIRITUAL ISOLATION: 
THE LOSS OF THE ELIZABETHAN WORLD-PICTURE 
"Existentialism" is a term so freqeuntly used and so widely applied 
that the ideas composing. the philosophy have become difficult to 
systematize. It is possible to find "existential" ideas in countless 
modern writers, and it. bec.omes almost impossible to distinguish 
existentialists from non-existentialists. The philosophy defies 
concise definition: like nineteenth-century Transcendentalism, there 
seem to be as many varieties of the doctrine as there are spokesmen. 
Perhaps a successful description of the movement is achieved in the 
listing of existential themes by G. E. Bigelow. The following are the 
themes he finds most conunonly expressed in "existential" writers, 
whether avowed existentialists or not: (1) "existence precedes 
essence"; (2) reason.is impotent to deal with the depths of human life; 
(3) man is alienated from the universe; (4) man is cursed with a "fear 
and trembling anxiety"; (5) man faces only nothingness; (6) man's only 
hope for authentic existence is to utilize his freedom. 1 
Of Bigelow's themes--which seem to apply more to the atheistic than 
to the Christian existentialist--! have singled out primarily the 
third, man's estrangement, for examination in this paper; this seems 
a very basic part of the existential attitude. ~he existentialists' 
idea of man's alienation is a part of the cultural inheritance of the 
twentieth century: four centuries of scientific progress and scientism, 
in large measure, have made this idea a part of the intellectual frame-
wo~k of the age. And the concept of man's isolation has, no doubt, 
1 
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contributed to the formation of other existential ideas. This type of 
existentialist-- without the belief in God •• views man as isolated from 
visible nature as well as the rest of the universe. I suggest that this 
theme is clearly expressed in the work of a nineteenth-century writer 
who has been largely overlooked in this connection: Herman Melvi.lle 
speaks in no uncertain terms of man's aloneness in the universe. · He 
cries out bitterly against the "malevolent" universe that victimizes 
man-- a universe empty of spiritual reality, a universe with no sympathy 
for man. 
It will be the purpose of this paper, therefore, to treat the idea 
of man's alienation as expressed by Melville. I believe his position 
can best be defined by reference, first, to the well-ordered world-
picture of Elizabethan times (using primarily George Herbert's "Man") 
and, second, to the changes in that old view which by Melville's time 
had created a far less stable and meaningful world. I will attempt to 
demonstrate that Melville's complete break with the old world-view 
really constitutes his existential estrangement. 
Perhaps the most striking contrast between the Elizabethan world 
and that of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is the all=encompa.ss-
ing Elizabethan dedication to unity. This habit of the Elizabethan 
mind is difficult to understand from a viewpoint inside the intellectual 
framework of the twentieth century; no such unity exists in our world. 
Mode·rn habits of thought, beginning perhaps in the eighteenth century, 
have led to "pigeon-holing" different subjects, different aspects of 
existence. Walls have been erected which have permanently divided the 
twentieth-century world. Distinctions have been made, according to 
Basil Willey, which have shut off "poetry from science, metaphor from 
fact, fancy from judgment. 11 2 Modern man is usually trapped within one 
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of these areas; there is no relation between them, no unifying trutho 
But in the seventeenth-century mind, Willey continues, 11 Many different 
worlds or countries of the mind ••• lay close together--the world of 
scholastic learning, the world of scientific experiemnt, the worlds of 
classica'l mythology and of Biblical history, of fable and of fact, of 
theology, and of demonology, of sacred and profane love •••• 11 And there 
was no sharp division between these worlds; all were linked together 
in complete harmony. The parts of the Elizabethan world functioned 
together as harmoniously as did the Ptolemaic spheres. A hierarchy 
existed--at least for the majority of the Elizabethans--in which every 
part of life had its posit~on; every aspect had its easily recognizable 
place in a unified pattern of ultimate reality. Although he precedes 
the seventeenth century, Elyot in the first chapter of The Governor 
is a clear exponent of this order which is vital in Elizabethan times. 
Hath not God set degrees and estates in all his glorious 
works? First in his heavenly ministers, whom he hath 
constituted in divers degrees c-alled hierarchies. Behold 
the four elements whereof the body of man is compact, how 
they be set in their places called spheres, higher or lower 
according to the sovereignty of their natures. Behold also 
the order that God hath put generally in all his creatures, 
beginning at the most inferior or base and ascending upward. 
He made not only herbs to garnish the earth but also trees 
of a more eminent stature than herbs. Semblably in birds and 
fishes some be good for the sustenance of man, some bear things 
profitable to sundry uses, other be apt to occupation and labour. 
Every kind of trees herbs birds beasts and fishes have a _ 
peculiar disposition appropered unto them by God their creator; 
so that in everything is order, and without order may be nothing 
stable or permanent. And it may not be called order except it 
do contain in it degrees, high and base, acjording to the merit 
or estimation of the thing that is ordered~ 
That ~hich made this remarkable homogeneity of the Elizabethan 
world possible was very obviously its Godo The Elizabethan world, as 
E. M. W. Tillyard points out, was seill solidly theocentric.4 Such a 
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well=ordered world would not have been possible without an exceedingly 
powerful central image to link the disparate elements of creation 
together~ and the seventeenth century found that image in God. God 
acted as the center of the Elizabe.than wheel; all revolved around him 
and drew essence and meaning from himo Or, to change the metaphor~ God 
was the zenith of existence and all else was in an appropriate spot on 
the hie.rarchy be low him. Obviously, such a strong point of reference 
gave this world-view a coherence that would be difficult to imagine 
todayo Nothing in the universe was foreign or senseless=-simply 
because it was linked to God in a fixed system of hierarchies. This 
i.s not to imply that there was accord on all matters in the seventeenth 
century; such was not the caseo As will be discussed in greater detail 
below 9 even in this age men such as Bacon, Locke, and Descartes were 
thinking and writing things that would have a great part in transform= 
ing this old world-view. Their ideas helped form a new world, a world 
based on Cartesian skepticism, Lockean psychology, Newtonian sciences--
a world foreign to the Elizabethans. Although these men had revolution= 
ary thoughts~ however, almost without exception they retained their hold 
on a theocentric, orderly universe. With very few exceptions, the 
thinkers and writers of the seventeenth century, whatever their philo= 
sophical viewsi, saw truth of some order in the Christi.an doctrine and 
the Bible. 
Of course, the seventeenth century was not unique in its demand 
for unity; it inherited what was already in the Middle Ages a highly 
ordered view of the world. The complex system of hierarchies had been 
fully worked out long before Elizabethan times. But literary evidences 
of the system, according to S. L. Bethell, were brought to the fore= 
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ground by the "restless intellection11 of the seventeenth century. 6 This 
age gave eloquent expression to a large number of inherited ideas, ideas 
that were a basic part of the intellectual framework already established. 
Such elements as Aristotelianism, Platonism~ Nee-Platonism~ Stoicism. 
and Christianity formed a pattern of conunonplace ideas and assumptions 
that were beyond disputation. Two of the fundamental assumptions~ or 
ideas taken for granted by the Elizabethans, are listed by Theodore 
Spencer: (1) 11 Man is not something by himse 1f; he is I a part of the 
order of things'"; and (2) 11 He must understand the universal order 
of which he is so essential a part, and which makes the structure of 
the world, of living beings, and of society, a single unity created by 
the hand of God. For order is behind everything.u7 Not only is all 
of creation a harmonious unity, but man is a vital part of that unity. 
Obviously, as will be discussed later in this paper, such a system gave 
man great comfort and assurance. Man need never worry about himself or 
any part of his world; it was all a part of the perfect order created 
and overseen by God. 
George Herbert, I believe, provides an unusually direct and clear 
picture of the theocentrically ordered Elizabethan world. Bethell rates 
him above Donne in this respect. Donne, of course, is more far-ranging; 
he incorporates more of the world into his poetry. But Bethell finds 
Herbert more direct, more representative of the old view. 8 Herbert is 
not to be viewed as simple or lacking education and sophistication~ but 
as a more narrowly religious poet he is less troubled than Donne by the 
"new astronomy" that "called all in doubt." Donne's religious faith 
is not destroyed by the new science~ but he is more sensitive to 
science's implications than is Herbert, who restricts himself to 
religious verse-- using primarily the Bible. liturgy, etc. Herbert 
6 
gives expression to the conventional theocentric world-view of the age~ 
to the conunonplace ideas of his world. 11It is to Herbert rs writings 
and life, 11 conunents Douglas Bush, 11 that we owe much of our picture of 
the order, strength, and beauty of seventeenth-century Anglicanism at 
its best.!1 9 In short, Herbert is a suitable spokesman for that majority 
in the seventeenth century which retains a divine order at the center of 
the universe. Of course, Herbert's view is not one if utter contentment 
and peace: Herbert is not without doubt. He suffered very greatly in his 
choice of the priesthood. His anxiety, in fact I is very strongly expre.ss-
ed in much of his poetry--"The Collar," "The Pulley," "Affliction (1) 1 
11 for example. Yet, from this suffering, Bush points out, came comprehen= 
sion and fulfillment; out of this s~ffering came even stronger conviction.10 
The reason for Herbert's final stability is extremely important: his 
struggle was with "Beauty," 11 Glory," 11 quick Wit and Conversation"; all 
problems that did have a possible solution--his struggle was not with 
faith in God, the benevolence of the universe, the nature of truth; all 
problems that would plague men of later generations and would allow no 
final answers. 
Of Herbert's poetry, one of the more direct and artistic expressions 
of the Elizabethan world=picture is the work entitled 11 Man 11 which is 
quoted be low. 
My God, I heard this day 
That none doth build a stately habitation 
But he that means to dwell therein. 
What house more stately hath there been, 
Or can be, than is man, to whose creation 
All things are in decay? 
For man is everything, 
And more: he is a tree, yet bears more fruit; 
A beast, yet is, or should be 1 more; 
Reason and speech we only bring; 
Parrots may thank us if they are not mute, 
They go upon the score. 
Man is all syrmnetry, 
Full of proportions, one limb to another, 
And all to all the world besides. 
Each part may call the farthest brother, 
For head with foot hath private amity, 
And both with moons and tides. 
Nothing hath got so far 
But man hath caught and kept it as his prey: 
His eyes dismount the highest star; 
He is in little all the sphere; 
Herbs gladly cure our flesh, because that they 
Find their acquaintance thereo 
For us the winds do blow, 
The earth doth rest, heav 1n move, and fountains flow. 
Nothing we see but means our good, 
As our delight, or as our treasure; 
The whole is either our cupboard of food, 
Or cabinet of pleasure. 
The stars have us to bed; 
Night draws the curtain, which the sun withdraws; 
Music and light attend our head; 
All things unto our flesh are kind 
In their descent and being, to our mind 
In their ascent and cause. 
Each thing is full of duty: 
Waters united .. are our navigation; 
Distinguished, our habitation; 
Below, our drink; above, our meat; 
Both are our cleanlinesso Hath one such beauty? 
Than how are all things neat! 
More servants wait on man 
Than he'll take notice of; in every path 
He treads down that which doth befriend him 
When sickness makes him pale and wana 
Oh, mighty loveb Man is one world and hath 
Another to attend himo 
Since then, my God, Thou hast 
So brave a palace built, 0 dwell in it, 
That it may dwell with Thee at last! 
Till then afford us so much wit 
That as the world serves us we may serve Thee, 
And both Thy servants be.11 
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Quite obviously, the poem 1 s central concern is the status of man 
in the Elizabethan world-pictureo And the judgment is a solid affirm-
ation of man's preeminence: the question which provides the structure 
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for the poem is simply, "What house more stately lthan mag/ hath there 
. been. o o? 11 The poem is primarily a listing of evidences to• support this 
idea, and the conclusion is a plea that, since man is 11 So brave a 
palace," God would dwell in him.so that he might eventu.ally dwell with 
God (in heaven)o A serious work could hardly be more optimistic about 
the nature and destiny of mano In order to fully understand this highly 
enthusiastic exaltation of man, I believe it will be necessary ,to 
examine in some detail the standard seventeenth century concept upon 
which this poem is based. The following paragraphs will be devoted to 
this mattero 
The underlying image which Herbert utilizes· in this poem in 
expressing his judgment on man is perhaps the most comprehensive of his 
ageo In addition, that image, the "chain of being," was in many ways 
responsible for creating the optimistic picture of man. As men in the 
Middle ages sought unity for the vast plenitude of God's creation, for 
the order they saw evidenced throughout the universe, the metaphor of 
the chain of being was formulated from an idea that began with Plato's 
Timaeus and was developed by Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists. 12 But, 
.as the idea was superimposed on the universe, it developed into more 
than a metaphor; it became a concrete fact, a reality. It became a 
vast chain, stretching from God at the top to the lowest speck of 
creation.at the bottom. The essential principles of the concept of the 
chain were termed "plenitude" and 11 continuity.f' The first of these, 
explains A.O. Lovejoy, "presupposed that, not only for the existence 
of this world, but for every one of its characteristics, for every kind 
of beings which it contains~- in strictness, indeed, for each particu-
lar being a- there must be an ultimate reason"; and continuity assumes 
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"there are no sudden 'leaps' in nature; infinitely various as things 
are, they form an absolutely smooth seque~ce, in which no break appears, 
to baffle the craving of our reason for continuity everywhereon 13 A 
perfect and ultimate unity was thus formed from the almost infinite 
diversity of the universe. Man's compelling desire for unity was 
satisfied by one simple, easily grasped scheme, a scheme rendered 
indisputable by the evidence available at every handa Two necessary 
implications of this scheme are apparent, says Tillyard: "First it 
made vivid the idea of a related universe where no part was superfluous; 
l~nd, consequentll:/ it enhanced the dignity of all creation, even of 
the meanest part of it. 1114 Man--of course--profited most of all by 
this system; his position on the scale made him creation's darling. 
The system was conceived as a means of order and as a means of exalting 
and praising God. However, the principal effect of the chain was to 
exalt man: it was man who occupied the 11 key 11 position.in the chain, 
and he bacame far-and-away the most interesting and talked-about 
component. 
The chain was visualized as a vertical gradation during the 
centuries up to and including the seventeenth. The gradation included 
all creation, dividing the.scale into classes of related creatures or 
objects. At the base of the scale lay the inanimate class, according 
to Bethell's description. Here, as in higher classes as well, there 
was a great complexity of levels of "virtue." Bethell quotes from the 
Natural Theology of Raymond de Sebonde: "There is a vast difference of 
virtue; water is nobler than earth, the ruby than the topaz~ gold than 
brass. 1115 And at the top of this ranking inside each class stood a 
primate, the most excellent being in that class. The second class of 
beings was termed "vegetative," the plant group. Each class possessed 
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a peculiar set of faculties: the vegetative class boasted existence and 
life and was thought to possess a profound ability to grow. Thus, when 
Donne speaks of his mistress's affections as having vegetable qualities, 
he is on firm ground. A third class, the "sensitive" group, possessed 
existence, life, and feeling. It was grade.cl according to the number 
of faculties possessed. Next, in the central slot in the scale, came 
man, who had all of the faculties of creatures below him as well as a 
part of those of the orders above him, the angels and God. 16 . Man, the 
"middle link, 11 was in Loyejoy' s terms a "point of transition from the 
merely sentient to .the intellectual forms of being. 1117 He was blessed 
with a rational soul, a will, and the power of reason. It should be 
pointed out, howe.ver, that man I s reason was limited in that it was 
merely discursive. And the angels, the order above man, surpassed his 
discursive reason with the power to reason intuitively, the power to 
perceive without the aid of senses. Finally, at the top of the scale 
came God, who possessed all faculties actively rather than merely 
potentially. The creatures above man were thought to correspond 
precisely in number to.those below him, so a delicate balance was 
maintained-- and man was the fulcrum; he was the point of balance. 
Man, as Pope points out in the Essay£!! Man, was the uni.quely 
necessary link in this chain of being. The.order of the universe 
depended on him, for he had thejob.of binding together.all creation. 
The greatest cosmic chasm was that between matter and spirit, and, 
as Tillyard points out, man was the bridge across that gulf. He 
continues, "During the whole period when the notion of the chain of 
being was prevalent, from the Pythagorean philosophy to Pope, it was 
man 1 s key position in creation== a kind of Clapham Junction where all 
the tracks converge and cross-- that so greatly exercised the human 
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imaginationo." 18 . Pico de Ua Miran.do la I s Oration .£!! the Di,gnity of Man 
is an apt statement .of this at.titude toward man as it ex.isted at its 
strongest from the. fifteenth through .the nineteenth centuryo 19 To 
Pico, man's positi,on was extremely crucial qecause he could use his 
power of reason to choose b~tween the .angelic life of the intellect and 
the animal life of the senses: he had the power to choose between 
heaven or hello It was his responsibility to understand and help 
maintain the splendid universal ·order he.found in the world. In short, 
the marvelous scheme of these centuries raised man higher than ever 
before or ever since; it gave man the means. to live .a life of uncommon 
intensity and drama,.and he did just.that. At least once since the 
Fall man had been lifted to a cosmic setting. 
As stated earlier, "Man" begins with the statement that man is 
a 11 statelyhabitation, 11 that there have been none more stately. 
Herbert uses the Biblical house metaphor for man: he is a fit dwell-
ing for God. And, as stated, it is the chain of being which provides 
more than sufficient foundation for this statemento Almost every 
image, every evidence, for Herbert's argument draws upon some assoc-
iation of the chain of being. The chain provides the central metaphor 
for the poem; all other images are. drawn from this -·- ;it is a point of 
reference for Herbert, a part of his worldmpicture that is proof-posi-
tive for his optimistic ideas about man. The dependence on the chain 
is obvious even in the first stanza: the statement in lines five and 
six is clearly based on that concept. All creation is below man on 
the scale, Herbert implies. All possess fewer faculties than·man~ and 
all will be insignificant, "in decay," when compared to man. The next 
two stanzas continue to exaltman in essentially this same fashion. 
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Stanza two says that man.has the faculties of the tree (vegetative 
class), yet he has mqreo He has the.faculties of.the beast (sensitive 
class), but he is more than a beast. Gn1yman has the faculties of 
reason and speecho If parrots have learned to speak, man has been the 
teacher. Stanza three rejoices in. the perfection of man's form: "Man 
is all symmetryo II Each member is in perfect harmony with all others. 
The hand and foot function together as. brothers, as part of the order 
that man sees everywhere else in his world ..... like the harmonious 
cooperation of "moons and tides. 11 No less perfection of form.would be 
appropriate for that being who was shaped in God's image and.is God's 
very.temple. 
In the. latter part of st.anza three Herbert alludes. to. a signifi-
cant ass1.1mption of the chain concept which has not as .Yet been mention-
ede He says not only.that man is symmetrical and proportional, but 
this proportion.corresponds to 11 all the worldbesides 0 11 The idea is 
given fuller. expression in stanza four: 11 He is in.little .all the 
sphere." Herbert here is drawing on.the Elizabethan commonplace that 
man is within himself a.small image of the world. Man's position in 
the scale of being.made.the "small image" idea a necessary developmento 
Man had the unique role of possessing all faculties and all possible 
states of being, so he quite naturally provided a miniature which 
contained parts correspondent to all of creation. In the language of 
the. age, he was a "microcosm" which corresponded .to the ."macrocosm, 11 
the universeo Spencer gives the excellent description of the microcosm 
concept which followsa This idea, he says, 
became a medieval platitude, and as we look back on 
the sixteenth-century it seems the most universal 
and most reveqling :syn:ibol for the whole concept of 
Nature's or.der and unity, and for the glorification of 
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man's place in theuniversal schemeo 
He continues, 
The whole universe, which was made for man, found in man 
its reflection and its epitome; man was the center of the 
ideal picture which optimistic theory delighted to.portray. 
Nature's order was shown in the elements, in the stars 9 in 
the hierarchy of sou ls, in the ranks of society. Everything 
inthe world was part of the same unified scheme, and the 
body and soul of man, each a reflection of the other, and 
both an image of the universal Blan, were the culmination and 
the final end of God's design.2 · 
This microcoslll-macrocosm concept can perhaps be best examined in 
relation to the seventeenth cent:ury system of correspondences. As 
stated, the chain was a continuous vertical structure composed of 
countless distinctive links. But the medieval search for unity had 
not been content with this; a system of horizontal planes had been 
formulated in which each plane held one or more of the classes of the 
scale of being. The planes, arranged one below another in the order 
.of dignity, provided countless evidences of universal order and design 
through their immense numbers of correspondences. 21 Here was endless 
·opportunity for expounding on the unity which was proved, first, by a 
being's location on the chain, and, secondly, by its correspondences 
with other beings on other planes. ·These planes of correspondence 
were the di.vine and angelic, the universe or macrocosm, the conunon-
22 
wealth or body politic, man or the microcosm, and the lower creation. 
Thus, man was one plane and all of creation was another, and these two 
provided the .most common grounds of the age for comparison. It was 
an unfailing resolution of the Elizabethan mind to find comparisons 
between these two and the other planes of the scheme. In fact, it was 
more than a conscious resolutionc:.:. the faith in comparisons, the ana= 
logical habit, beca!l).e a prevalent mode of thinking for the ages 
influenced by the chain. The system of correspondences was both a 
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product of and a stimulant for this analogic habit of 'thinking, a 
method of reasoning that had the authority of law. For a theocentric; 
authoritarian society such as theirs, this was a comfortable mode of 
thoughto And with their devotion of ceremony and ritual, Tillyard 
says, 11 they found the formality of these correspondences very 
congenial. 1123 A number of critics have suggested that metaphysical 
poetry is an offspring of the habit of free-ranging analogy. Bethell 
accepts this theory for Donne's metaphysical conceits, which he sees 
as the analogical habit applied to the two cosmologies with which 
24 Donne was concerned, the old and the new. 
Returning to the text of 11 Man, 11 it is clear that Herbert is 
representative of the seventeenth-century dependence on analogy. 
Stanza four, as already pointed out, .contains his explicit reference 
to the microcosm-macrocosm correspondences: 11 He is in little all the 
sphere." The poet then con~inues the correspondence--herbs gladly 
cure men's flesh because they find their 11 faniiliar 11 there; they find 
in man a part of themselves (the vegetable soul) •. George Williamson's 
analysis in Six Metaphysical Poets div~des 11Man 11 according to Herbert's 
introduction of the microcosm at this point. In the first three verses, 
man's splendor is described rather generally in terms of the chain, but 
in four the microcosm is presented in i.ts fullness; the chain reference 
is more specific. 25 
From the fifth through the next-to-the-last stanza, Herbert ex-
plains man's reward for serving as the key link in the chain and as 
the microcosm of all creation. Speaking for his age, the poet has no 
doubt whatever that the world was made solely for man. The winds blow 
for man, he says; the earth stands still and the heavens move for man. 
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Herbert is speaking here, of course, of the older astronomy, the 
Ptole~aic system of a fixed earth and moving heavenly spheres. He does 
not seem to have been greatly bothered by the threats of the new science, 
for we find none of the troubled references to science in his verses 
that are so plentiful in Donne. Lines 27-30 continue with the assertion 
that all is for the good of man; that all is either delight, treasure, 
food or pleasure for man. Six continues this thought still furthet'-• 
the stars, night, sun, music, and light all have their well-defined 
services to render to man. In lines 34-36 the poet refers to the 
microcosm in direct .terms: 11 All things unto our flesh are kind/ In 
their descent and being, to our mind/ In their ascent and cause." To 
paraphrase, all things below man on the chain are akin ("kind") to his 
flesh, and all above him are like him in mind and final cause.26 In 
lines 37-42 Herbert illustrates nature's subservience to man by using 
the element water as an example. Water is so dutiful a servant that it 
provides man with a means of travel: it separates to give him a dwelling 
place; it gives food, drink, and cleanliness. The poet exclaims-• if 
just one element can do all this for. man, how marvelous is all of 
creation1 The next-to-the-last stanza begins with a reprimand for man 
because he has ignored his many willing servants: "More servants wait 
on man than he' 11 take notice ofo 11 Then lines 47-48 close this portion 
of the poem with an exclamation that man is one world (microcosm) and 
has the world of nature (macrocosm) to serve him. The final lines of 
the poem return to the statement of stanza one, that man is God's state-
ly house, his brave palace. Herbert pleads with God to live in man--
since he is this splendid temple-• and to help man live with him finally 
in heaven. The last two lines are a superb summary not only of the poem 
but of man's place in the Elizabethan age: 11 That as the world serves us 
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we may serve Thee,/ And both thy servants beo 11 Man could hardly be more 
happily situated. All of nature bows humbly at his feet, awaiting his 
command. And he in turn serves his creator by recognizing and maintain-
ing the harmonious order and rectitude that are manifest in the universe. 
The twentieth-century reader of George Herbert may find it quite 
difficult to imagine the optimism that he expressed in "Man. 11 It is 
not easy to glimpse the world picture he saw which placed man high in 
an "ivory tower." The problem is not in understanding Herbert, but in 
realizing that almost all of his age looked at this world picture. The 
Elizabethans were almost unanimous in their agreement; the world had 
without a doubt been made for man and placed at his disposal. He, as 
God's agent, was master of all the world. Spencer quotes La Primaudaye 
as a representative of this attitude: 
When I admire ••• so many wonderful works under the cope of heaven 
I cannot marvel enough at the excellency of Man, for whom all 
these things were created, and are maintained and preserved in 
their being and moving, ~7 one and the same divine providence 
always like unto itself. 
Even Bacon, the exponent of scientific thinking untainted by 
religious thought, gives his support in favor of man: 
Man if we look to final causes, may be regarded as the centre 
of the world; insomuch that if man were taken away from the 
world, the rest would seem to be all astray, without aim or 
purpose •••• and leading to nothing. For the whole world works 
together in the service of man; and there is nothing from which 
he does not derive use and fruit ••• insomuch that all things seem 
to be going about man's business and not their own.28 
At this point, sufficient evidence has been given to support three 
general conclusions about the Elizabethan world-picture. First, as 
seen in "Man," the seventeenth century looked at man quite optimisti-
cally as an exalted being, a unique and marvelous creature. Second, 
man lived in a theocentric universe. The chain of being and the 
ultimate unity and order of creation testified to the existence of a 
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creator, a creator who fondly looked upon man as the best of creation. 
Thirdly, man's position on the scale gave him an intimate relation with 
nature as well as with God: nature was his obedient slave. It was 
sympathetic to his every need or desire. These three concepts harmon-
ized perfectly; they blended and interlocked in a myriad of ways to form 
a world-picture that must have seemed unbreakable to the Elizabethan. 
But, of course, that picture did break. And in its place another 
world-picture was constructed which was to become equally convincing. 
The remainder of this paper will deal with this new world-picture, more 
specifically, with some of the concepts which were substituted for 
Elizabethan ideas. As stated previously, Herman Melville will be 
examined as an early representative of the "modern" view, a view which 
contrasts very strongly with the Elizabethan world-view. Melville is, 
in a sense, a nineteenth-century prophet of modern attitudes that became 
well established a(ter his death and which have become a basic part of 
the "existential attitude" common to the late nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. Perhaps it will be most profitable to approach Melville 
through a brief discussion of the changes which occurred between his 
time and Herbert's that helped create Melville's idea of the world. The 
goal of this paper is to better illuminate Melville I s "existential" 
stance, first, by contrasting it with its predecessor, and, second, by 
showing its development from (or, more correctly, development away from) 
that predecessor. That development, that transition between the two 
world pictures, will, therefore, provide the subject for the following 
paragr,phs. 
Perhaps I have been guilty of oversimplifying the Elizabethan 
world-picture for the sake of depicting the remarkable unity it did 
achieve on such matters as the divine order of the universe, etc. For 
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there were dissenters in Herbert's day; there were men who were beginn-
ing to challenge the accepted commonplaces and defy the traditional 
sources of truth. Although men such as Bacon, Descartes, Locke, Hobbes, 
etc., with few exceptions, were not challenging the broader outlines of 
the Elizabethan world picture, they did begin to see defects in various 
aspects of its structure. 29 In most cases, they retained their faith in 
God, man, divine order, beneficent nature, etc., but, at the same time, 
they were discovering that many of the details of the scheme were 
inconsistent. And they must for this reason be considered the revolu-
tionists of the seventeenth century. Whether they meant to or not, they 
began the movement that was to destroy the old world-view. Herbert's 
own friend, Francis Bacon, argued that scientific thought should not be 
corrupted by combining it with religious thought.30 In other words, 
truth should be arrived at inductively; traditional analogical thought 
was damaging in considering scientific truth. Descartes closely 
paralleled this view with his skeptical scrutiny of the universe, with 
his insistence that truth must be proved rather than accepted on 
authority. The eventual effects of such ideas on the Elizabethan system 
of analogical correspondences (and all religious truth) is obvious. In 
addition, John Locke's epistemological theories were a significant 
contribution to the revolution. And, very importantly, Newton provided 
new views of the controlling forces in the universe. Such men and men 
of earlier centuries as well-- Galileo, Kepler, Machiavelli·~were 
announcing the imminent fall of the old world-view. Whether or not 
they intended to destroy the old view, they began the attack which 
accomplished precisely that. 
One of the first significant changes in the old world-scheme 
becomes noticeable at the end of the seventeenth century and grows in 
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intensity through the eighteenth. Newton, in discovering scientific 
laws to explain the working of the cosmos, had cleared the path for a 
revised concept of order. The older scheme had given God complete 
responsibility for order; and order was conceivable primarily in terms 
of correspondences. However, Newton's system, as it came to be applied, 
removed the purposive harmony from the universe and replaced it with a 
mechanical system, what Willey calls "a world of quantity, a world of 
matheml;ltically computable motions in mechanical regularity. 1131 Willey 
further explains that Cartesian metaphysics was a large component of the 
Newtonian scheme, and that the product of the union was a system of 
thought so powerful that it "became the predominant world-view of modern 
times." One inevitable result of this mathematical picture of the 
universe was the lessening of God's authority. Newton's machine merely 
needed someone to start it. Then it ran independently. So God was 
reduced from the status of Master Director to Observer: he became the 
Watchmaker God of Deism. Simultaneously, according to M. M. Fitzgerald, 
Locke's theory was creating a greater respect for nature: if man did 
indeed learn of the universe through stimulation of the senses by 
naturels objects, nature must of necessity have a rather high degree 
of authority. 32 Nature began to be a "religion" unto itself, and, says 
Willey, "As 'natural religion I came more and more to seem all sufficient, 
'revelation' began to appear, if not superfluous, at least secondary, 
and perhaps even slightly inconvenient. 1133 What we have occurring, then, 
is a move away from the traditional, orthodox view of God toward a 
conseq1,1ent increase in the religious role of nature--a move that was 
quite general in the eighteenth century and of very great significanceo 
By the end of the eighteenth century, such deistic ideas had in great 
measure dethroned God; he was rapidly becoming impotent in comparison 
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to his former power-- he was being pushed further and further away from 
the connection with creation he had enjoyed as the top link of the chain. 
By the end of this age, the theocentric universe was no longer the 
unquestioned certainty that it had once been. Bethell comments that 
Christianity survived the attacks of science and scientism, but "the 
world-view was no longer Christian; and specifically Christian attitudes 
become .limited to the spiritual and moral life. 1134 Men of the coming 
century would.face religious decision hitherto unnecessary. 
The image of God was not the only component of the old scheme that 
was to suffer change in the eighteenth century. For, as already seen, 
man's exalted position in the old scheme was very closely tied to God's: 
man was important as God's agent on earth, an agent who drew authority 
from his spiritual kinship to God. But in the new scheme God was on 
his way out of the universe, and man's noble rank as a spiritual being 
was sure to follow. Everything on earth had previously been related to 
the central problem of man. The new scheme, however, Bethell explains, 
"possessing ••• the austere beauty of a mathematical theorem, has no more 
meaning than a piece of clockwork of which we cannot guess the use. 1135 
Perhaps the decay of man's noble status can best be understood in 
relation to the chain of being, for it had given him that status. The 
chain had been inherited as a central idea in the eighteenth century, 
although revised to comply with Newtonian mechanical laws.36 The chain 
served as a useful reinforcement of the new mathematical order and 
coherel).ce assigned to the universe. Yet, the ideas of the chain were at 
heart 3pposed to the strict rationalism of the age, as Lovejoy points 
out, and they were to undergo remarkable transformations in their new 
role.37 The eighteenth century tried to retain the chain of being, but 
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it attempted to rationalize and fully develop the old concepts; and the 
result ._was disastrous, especially for man. First of all, this age began 
to scrutinize man's role as 'center link' in the chain. An obvious 
difficulty began to present itself: if man were indeed both spirit and 
matter, he hag a dual, unharmonious nature. He was necessarily the most 
unstable creature of the entire chain.38 Secondly, the principle of 
continuity inherent in the chain, upon the closer examination of this 
age, began to bridge the gap between man and nature; man's spiritual 
faculties became less and less a distinction. Third, there was an 
increasing realization in this period that the chain allowed room for 
a vast.number of spiritual creatures above man. If man were actually 
the mid-point, there must be as many links above man as below him: when 
carefully examined, this was not at all flattering to man. Lovejoy 
comments on this matter: 
Only a segment of the scale exists on this planet, and l;_aE.7 
happens to be the not altogether non-rational yet on the whole 
very stupid creature who occupies a certain point in the series--
a little higher, indeed, than any other on the globe which he 
inhabits, yet incalculably below the highest.39 
The rationalizing on this point continued to the extreme of insisting 
that the links of the chain above man must inhabit various planets other 
than the earth. Such an idea became extremely common in the eighteenth 
century. 
A highly significant change of another type was taking place in 
the chain of being at this time; it has been termed the 11 temporalization" 
of the chain by Lovejoy. 40 In his very thorough treatment of the 
matter he describes this as "one of the principal happenings of the 
eighteenth century." The principles of plenitude and continuity, he 
explains, were primarily the cause of this transformation because they 
began to blend with the concept of evolution.41 A wide-spread 
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inclination toward "evolution" can be seen in this period: evolution-
ary thinking long antedated scientific discoveries such as those by 
Darwin.that gave supporting evidence for such views. As part of this 
attitude, the chain's plenitude and continuity began to be seen as a 
succession rather than a "ready-made cosmical order." The plenum 
formarwn, the catalog of nature, came to be seen, Lovejoy says, 11 not 
as the inventory but as the program of nature, which is being carried 
out gradually and exceedingly slowly in the cosmic history. 1142 Metaphor-
ically speaking, the chain was being transformed from the old vertical 
scale on which each creature was a separate and distinct gradation to a 
horizontal scale on which members of creation were involved in a 
progressive move up to higher levels of being. 
As would be expected, this temporalization of the chain also had 
its effects on the place of God in the universe. Again I quote Lovejoy's 
full explanation of the matter. 
When the chain of being ••• came to be explicitly conceived, 
no longer as complete once for all and everlastingly the same 
in the kinds of its components, but as gradually evolving 
from a less to a greater degree of fullness and excellence, 
the question inevitably arose whether a God eternally complete 
and immutable could 'be supposed to be manifested in such a 
universe. 43 
God's traditional existence as a separate, transcendent Being was being 
gravely threatened by this development of the intellectual framework. 
And by~he end of the century, the inevitable happened: God himself was 
temporalized. God himself became synonymous with the progressive 
movement of nature upward toward a point of perfection.44 The chain 
of being, then, had been converted to a becoming, a process, and God 
was a part of that process; or more correctly, he.!!!.!. that process. 
With the completion of this transformation of the chain, a type of God 
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new to ·Christian world had been produced. The God of the old scheme 
had been, in Lovejoy's terms, an "other-worldly God," separate, distinct 
from tqe world. The God of the new evolutionary scale, however, was 
"this-worldly": a combination with natural creationo Again, as we have 
already observed in the case of Deism, the conception of God is being 
weakened -- much to the benefit of nature. God, in becoming 11 this-
worldly, 11 was being fused with nature and losing his identity in doing 
so. 
At this point, a number of changes have been examined which occurr-
ed in the century following Herbert. Those discussed were, I believe, 
among the major forces in reshaping the Elizabethan world-view into a 
scienti.ficallY. mechanistic scheme. Perhaps the most significant result 
of this change in world schemes is that discussed just above: the 
weakening of the traditional Christian conception of God. The 
significance is obvious -- as God faded away, man as a semi-spiritual 
being found himself more and more isolated in his universe. And one of 
the hardest things for man to bear is spiritual isolation. Man must 
have some hold on life, some connection with What Is to give his life 
meaning. God had for centuries provided an intimate relation with 
Being. With the removal of God from the universe (comparatively 
speaking) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, man 
found himself very much in need of a substitute, some replacement for 
the lost sense of relation and association. That substitute, quite 
clearly, was the concept of nature which, as mentioned, had been gain-
ing preeminence under the new evolutionary scheme. "With the waning of 
religious faith," states J. W. Beach, "liaE:,/ grasps at nature--at the 
great benevolent order of things in which every individual is provided 
for in the harmonious plan of the whole; which speaks to him through 
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every lovely lf,nd sublime object •••• ,;45 For the literary mind at least, 
explains Beach, the romantic concept of nature did amount to a type of 
substitute, one which provided a "moral and intelligible universe." 
"Nature" became synonymous with moral teacher, teacher of order, etc., 
and it was still conceived as benevolent to man, as sympathetic to his 
desires and wishes. The affinities of these romantic views to the 
temporalized chain of being are conspicuouso It would be correct, I 
think, to view Romanticism as a development, a revision, of the chain 
of being. Though some of the Romantics, Coleridge, for.instance, 
rejected evolutionary ideas-- thougn many of these writers were deeply 
religious, a very basic part of their poetic world was the chain as it 
had been altered by deistic and evolutionary influence. But, be that 
as it may, the literary mind of the Romantic period turned to nature 
in many instances as a means of ordering the universe, as a substitute 
for the old order. Nature, however, was to serve a limited appointment 
as substitute: it was in a broader sense a transition to the scientific 
positivism characteristic of the twentieth century. Beach explains 
this matter as follows: 
The human mind cannot suddenly pass with ease and comfort from 
any form of faith to agnosticism or unbelief. It instinctively 
p~ovides itself with means for easing off the emotional strain 
of such a transition. It provides philosophical bridges from 
faith to unfaith. And such a bridge was the romantic cult of 
nature, considered in the large. It made possible the passage 
without too great emotional strain from medieval Christian 
faith to the scientific positivism which came to dominate 
cultivated minds today.46 
Very importantly, scientific positivism was to triumph in the end. 
Scientific positivism was the scheme that finally replaced the 
Elizabethan world-view; Romanticism was only a transition. Romanticism 
was an attempt to keep moral order in a world which was moving rapidly 
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toward .a coldly mechanistic science. 
Wordsworth is an excellent example of the Romantic's substitution 
of nature for the old order. As Willey explains, Wordsworth was one of 
the first great poets to be left without a ready-made order; he faced 
the task of ptoducing poetry with no established "mythology.1147 His 
choice was to create a poetic system, as later poets were to do, or to 
connnunicate directly with the visible universe. He chose to do the 
latter~ connnunication with nature became the basis of his poetry and, 
at the same time, his defense against the loneliness of the scientific 
world. For him, nature still possessed the world soul of the 
temporalized chain of being. As Beach explains, he avoided materialism 
in his turning to nature by finding this spirit or active principle in 
natural creation. In fact, Beach sums up Wordsworth's romanticism as 
a fusing of the active-principle or spirit and the benevolent, unified 
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nature of the chain of being. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson occupies a position very close to Wordsworth 
in matters relevant to this paper, but he should be mentioned briefly 
for at least one reason. Through coincidence, Emerson provides an 
excellent distinction between the old world-scheme and that of the new 
as seen by the Romantic of the nineteenth century. Near the end of his 
first book, Nature, Emerson quotes five stanzas from Herbert's "Man." 
The significance of this is that these five carefully omit references 
to the Christian God whom Herbert addressed. Herbert uses his poem to 
rejoice in that-- through God's kindness-- all nature serves man. 
Emerson, on the other hand, removes the "other-worldly" God from the 
poem and finds his comfort in the benevolent service of nature which 
Herbert describes. He is able to find assurance in the moral order 
in nature without the aid of the traditional God; just a few pages 
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before he quotes 11Man 11 he states that, 11lt has already been illustrated, 
that every natural process is a version of a moral sentence. The moral 
law lies at the centre of nature and radiates to the circumference. n49 
His strongly developed concept of the world-spirit ("natural process") 
is able to serve as substitute for Herbert's God. 
For those like Emerson who -- with the help of an rtOver-Soul," etc. 
--maintained the old scheme's benevolent nature in spite of the chang-
ing world-view, optimism about man and his place in the universe was 
still possible. But for some in Emerson's time, those who were, in a 
sense, more seriously affected by the new science, nothing but 
scepticism remained -- scepticism which, Geoffrey Stone points out, was 
"the result of the loss of a world-picture comfortable and familiar.u 50 
Herman Melville is such a figure: he faced the nineteenth-century 
universe with a thorough pessimism about man, truth, nature. And I 
suggest that his position is largely because of his loss of the old 
world-picture; he-· far more than even Wordsworth (who retained an 
orderly Nature)-- confronts a world devoid of unity, order, and 
benefic~nce. He found himself alone in a universe which offered no 
apparent reason or purpose, no unifying scheme to give man a tangible 
relation to his universe. That harmony which did exist in the universe 
for Melville seemed evil, sinister-- conspiring against helpless man. 
As stated in the introduction of this paper, Melville faced an 
"existential" universe, one devoid of meaning for man. He found him-
self estranged from God, nature-- from everything.which offered meaning-
ful relationship. He was alone in the universe, separated from it; and 
his work was greatly influenced by that separation: indeed, it provides 
an underlying theme for many of his books and stories. And his 
separation is significant in a broader sense: it was far more prothetic 
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than was Romanticism of the new world-view of the late nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries; and it was an early representative of the literary 
and philosophical existentialism which was to become an important com-
ponent of the new world-pictureo 
Perhaps it should be emphasized, however, that existentialism was 
to be only one component of the new world-view: Melville's alienation 
was prophetic of an existential attitude that formed only~ part of 
the modern world. There were to be a number of other components of 
equal or even greater importance in forming the intellectual framework 
of the latter nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and it would be 
incorrect to exaggerate falsely the significance of existentialism. 
John Macquarrie in Twentieth-Century Religious Thought presents five 
philosophies which he finds significant in contemporary thought: these, 
he declares, can be classified as either metaphysical or anti-meta-
physical systems. 51 The metaphysical includes 11New Realism" and neo-
Thomism, both of which he finds to be of major consequence. New 
Realism, he explains, was short-lived in England where it began, but 
it has remained strong in America, largely through the influence of 
A. N. Whitehead. Neo-Thomism, closely allied to Roman Catholic 
theology, has become one of the major intellectual forces of our time, 
according to Macquarrie. It boasts such first-class thinkers as 
Jacques Maritain, F.C. Copleston, and E. Gilsono The anti-metaphysical 
philosophies include logical empiricism, kerygmatic theology, and 
existentialism. The first, earlier called "logical positivism," is 
a developemnt of the New Realism; it inherits the analytical tendencies 
of the thought of G. E. Moore and A. Wo Russell. Kerygmatic theology, 
associated closely with the name of Karl Barth, 11 has been the most 
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influential movement in the Protestant theology of the present century," 
according to Macquarrie. It relates in one respect to Catholic neo-
Thomism, he continues, 11 for in the face of the conflicts of modern 
philosophies, both have withdrawn to the security of a classic Christian 
tradition. 11 52 The third system in this category, existentialism, is the 
descendent of earlier philosophies of personal being. It contains 
elements of Dilthey 1 s historicism, Husserl's phenomenology, and the 
"philosophies of life and action." From this extremely brief discussion 
of Macquarrie 1 s analysis it should at least be obvious that existential-
ism takes its place beside other notable intellectual movements in the 
twentieth century. Very importantly, however, Macquarrie does give 
existentialism one major distinction: he finds it to be the "most 
typical product of the century. 11 
Melville obviously makes a very important move away from the old 
world-view toward spiritual isolation when he dismisses Herbert's 
God (and even the God of Deism): the traditional authoritarian God 
has been removed. As will be discussed below in greater detail, 
Melville does not only remove Herbert's God, he declares that any 
existent God must be an evil one. Indeed, Moby Dick, Billy Budd, 
Pierre, Mardi, and others to lesser degrees contain numerous veiled 
and direct attacks on the Deity. However, at this point it should be 
emphasized that Melville was, to say the least, concerned about 
spiritual existence. Hawthorne described him as always willing to 
discourse on 11Providence 11 and 11 futurity 11 and "everything that lies 
beyond human ken. 11 Hawthorne continues, 11 If he were a religious man, 
he would be one of the most truly religious and reverential; he has a 
very high and noble nature, and better worth immortality than most of 
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us. 1153 But, like St. Enunanuel in Unamuno 1 s story, Melville was unable 
to. believe that which he most wanted to believeo Melville insisted 
above all else on rational, concrete proof of any ideal system which 
attempted to explain the universe; even more, he wanted to know truth 
by his own experience. In addition 9 he had been alienated from religion, 
or at least organized religion, by its defense of what· he considered 
obvious fallacy. Such thinking carried Melville to the inevitable 
result: what Tyrus Hillway describes as "tentative agnosticism.11 54 In 
Hawthorne's passage referred to above, Melville is described as inform-
ing Hawthorne that 
he had 'pretty much made up his.mind to be annihilated'; and, 
I think, will never rest until he gets hold of a definite 
belief. It is strange how he persists--and has persisted 
ever since I knew him--in wandering to-and-fro over these 
de_serts, as dismal and monotonous_ as the sand hills amid which 
we were sittingo He can neither believe nor be comfortable in 
hi~ unbelief •••• 
In staqng that he had "made up his mind to be annihilated," Melville 
meant of course that he had reached the decision that there was no life 
after death. However much he may have wanted traditional religious 
be lief, he could not convince himself that it was valid and he could 
not finally accept it. He was simply not able to find sufficient 
logical- foundation to support that religious belief which had been of 
such comfort to the men of Herbert's world. 
Yet that which moves Melville into total spiritual isolation is 
more th~n just his rejection of the traditional God; it is his rejection 
of any substitute system which attempts to establish order. As has 
been observed, the Romantics retained a benevolent 9 orderly nature as a 
substitute for the traditional God. This afforded a useful aid in giv-
ing meaning to man's world. But, as Hillway points out 9 Melville's 
personal experience had shown him far too much of the brutality of 
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nature (and of man); he was unable to accept the optimistic.assumption 
that all worked for the benefit of man~ that there was an inherent 
beneficence in nature and God.SS It seems reasonable to assume that 
Melville's experiences at sea were very influential in shaping his 
ideaL about the intent and design of nature. A second substitute 
system which would have been available to Melville was naturalistic 
science. Nineteenth-century naturalistic s.cience was emerging l> in 
Hillway' s terms, "as the single most influential factor in civilized 
human life.11 56 And this influence on Melville can not be overestimated: 
more than most of the literary men of his day, he read scientific works 
and prepared himself for his decision about the universe.s7 (Ishmael's 
geological discussion as he recounts the whale's ancient ancestry 
provides excellent proof of Melville's scientific competence; and his 
attitude is one of extreme fondness for modern science). Melville could 
see the .. eventual conquest of scientific realism over both romanticism 
and anti-scientific religion. As Hillway explains, he did not, like 
Evert Duyckinck, attempt to ignore science, or~ like Hawthorne, to pass 
over it as of minor importance: he had the intellectual integrity to 
see that science would be the final victor in the new world=scheme.s8 
But unlike Morgoth in Clarel, Melville does not seize upon this coldly 
efficient scientific system. Melville admired science for its precise 
analysi~, but he avoided it as an answer)) a system)) for fear that it 
would lead to a false religion-=just as orthodox religion had done for 
him. In rejecting science)) he rejected the final "organized" system 
available to give order and meaning to his universe. Like Henry Adams, 
he tried all possibilities and found all lacking: he found no means of 
relation to his universe. No final answer seemed acceptab1e=-he offered 
only a strong 1 No·' to any organized system or ready-made solution. 
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Evidence of Melville's existential isolation is only to a very 
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small degree biographical; by far the.· greater evidence is contained in 
his writingo As stated above, his. attitude finds strong expression in 
many of hi,s workso Melville .is quite notable, in fact, for the degree 
to which he adapts fiction to the expression of personal views--sometimes 
through the use of allegory, sometimes through a vague biographical 
parallel such as he used in Pierreo The remainder of this paper, 
therefore, will deal with Melville's spiritual isolation from his 
universe as expressed in a number of his works, primarily Moby Dick, 
Pierre, and Mardi, in that ordero 
MobyDick provides an obvious beginning point for this examination 
not merely because it is.Melville's masterpiece, but because it serves 
as the 11 gospe~11 of his spiritual isolation; it is his deepest and most 
intense. look at the problems which plagued him throughout his lifeo 
Those probelms are well summed up by Ishmael, who very often speaks for 
Melville as well as for himself: "With the problem of the universe 
revolving in me, how co.uld Iooobut lightly hold by obligationsoooo 1159 
This was Melville .1 s problem, "the problem of the universe, 11 and it was 
the same problem Nietzsche encountered. 11 The general character of the 
world," said Neitzsche, "is to all eternity chaos: not by the absence 
of necessity, but in the sense of the absence of order, structure, form, 
beauty, _wisdom, and whatever else aesthetic humanities are calledo" 60 
That same chaos was to Melville the central characteristic of the 
universeo Nature, 11 God 1 s great unflattering laureate," is to him some-
thing v~ry different from the poetic world of the Romantics: when he 
looked at nature he did not see a harmonious, peaceful order, but 
rather the terrific struggle-for=existence that reigns throughout 
natural creation. The sea, as his d01p.inant artistic symbol for nature, 
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was a u~iversal cannibalism. As Ishmael says, 
But not only is the sea such a foe to man who is an alien 
to it, but it is also a fiend to its own offspring; worse than 
the Persian host who murdered his own guests; sparing not the 
creatures which itself hath spawned. Like a savage tigress that 
tossing in the jungle overlays her own cubs, so the sea dashes 
even the mightiest whales against the rocks, and leaves them 
there side by side with the split wrecks of ships. No mercy, 
no power but its own controls it. Panting and snorting like a 
mad battle steed that has lost its rider, the masterless ocean 
overruns the globe (p.270). 
Fleece says the same as he preaches to the sharks that follow the Pequod: 
"Your woracious, fellow-critters, I don't blame ye so much for; dat is 
natur, and can't be helped; but to gobern dat wicked natur, dat is de 
pint" (p. 288). But it is significant that the sea, which is depicted 
as evil and cannibalistic, is also the medium of truth, fleeting 
though truth may be. The sea for Melville, according to John Bernstein 
in Pacifism and Rebellion in the Writings of Herman Melville, represents 
a "realm of actuality"; a means of glimpsing that which is valid. 61 
In "The Lee Shore" Melville expresses this idea about the sea, that "in 
landlessness alone resides the highest truth, shoreless, indefinite 
as God .... 11 And in the same passage he states that "better it is to 
perish in that howling infinite, than be ingloriously dashed upon the 
lee, even if that were safetyl"(p. 116). Man should perish boldly in 
the raging sea--the only medium of truth--rather than waste away in the 
secluded safety of the shore. 
Melville does not confine chaotic evil to the sea, however: all of 
nature is includedo For instance, Ishmael reasons that a young New 
England colt demonstrates a knowledge of the evil of nature by its 
fearful reaction to a buffalo robe: "here thou beholdest even in a 
dumb brute, the instinct of the knowledge of the demonism in the world" 
(p. 195). And what the colt saw in the buffalo robe, Ishmael (for 
Melvill~) was able to find throughout the world: 
Thus, then, the muffled rollings of a milky sea; the bleak 
rustlings of the festooned frosts of mountains; the desolate 
shiftings of the windrowed snows of prairies; all these, to 
lsrnnael, are as the shaking of that buffalo robe to the 
frightened coltl (p. 196). 
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Though he does not know what it is he fears, Isrnnael continues, he 
is afraid: 11 Though in many of its aspects this visible world seems 
formed j.n love, the invisible spheres were formed in fright.11 This 
intense fear of an unknown evil is a predominant element in the book. 
In the same chapter as the passage above, Isrnnael expounds on the 
deceptive practices of nature in covering her evil designs. He says 
that the beauties of nature, the beautiful skies, forests, butterflies, 
young girls, etc., are 
but subtle deceits, not actually inherent in substances, but 
only laid on from without; so that all deified Nature absolutely 
paints like the harlot, whose allurements cover nothing but the 
charnel house within ••• (p. 196). 
With such a viewpoint, Isrnnae 1 concludes that 11 the palsied universe 
lies before us a leper." Isrnnael here lays down a rule that extends 
throughout Melville's work. The symbolism in "Benito Cereno, 11 accord-
ing to Hillway, is based on this same concept, the earth's evil and 
vulturism. And Hillway sums up 11 The Encantadas" as painting 11 the grey 
picture of a world cursed and made barren by its own vulturi.sm, a world 
62 
rendered bearable only by patience and courage." 
The fear of the universe that is expressed repeatedly in Moby 
Dick extends higher than mere inanimate or animal creation. Social 
laws and perhaps even man himself become a part of the chaotic evil 
that pervades creation. The debauched and miserable lives of the men 
of the Pequod are hardly part of a benevolent or meaningful order. And 
the utter cruelty of the laws on ship-board is ample evidence for 
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Melville of the malevolent order in the world. Melville repeatedly 
protests about such injustice to man which occurred as part of naval 
"law." In this matter he closely approximates Ionesco, who according 
tow. V. Spanos, blames God as the oppressor when man is the helpless 
victim of social tyranny, etc.--even if the evil seems to be of man's 
k . 63 own ma 1.ng. 
such an idea. 
Billy Budd appears to be an elaborate testimonial to 
Billy is sacrificed to an inherently--even necessarily--
evil system, one in which the innocence represented by Billy is useless 
and out-of-place. Melville protests that man's necessary system which 
destroys Billy is as evil as everything else in the universe. 
The reason for Ahab's mad venture in Moby Dick, as Hillway explains, 
is his 11 de liberate protest against the sharkish nature of the world"--
64 
which has been discussed above. But, of course, there is an obvious 
implication here: to indict nature is to indict her creator, the one 
responsible for her actions. Melville very intentionally does this: 
he blames the creator for the irrationality, the chaos of the universe. 
Moby Dick, comments Denham Sutcliffe, "de liberate ly calls into question 
the benevolence of deity, and even of its existence" (afterword to 
Moby Dick, p. 542). Even in the eyes of Father Mapple, God is "chiefly 
known to me by Thy rod" (p. 64). The God who unleashed this fierce 
cannibalistic world must be like his nightmarish creation. Ahab 
rebelled against both the sharkish world and its creator, and his 
rebellion is the basis of Moby Dick. Ahab could not, however, rebel 
directly against God, the intangible, indefinite being. He could only 
assault some part of God's creation which acted as a divine agent. 
Ahab himself explains this: "Would now the wind but had a body; but 
all the things that most exasJerate and outrage mortal man, all these 
things are bodiless, but only bodiless as objects, not as agents"(p.526). 
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And he felt that the bodiless unknown who had caused the chaotic world 
was represented in such a pbys,ical agent, the White Whale. Thus, it was 
Ahab's monomaniac resolve to destroy the whale, to have his revenge on 
Moby Dick for the cruelty of all nature. As God's agent, then, the whale 
was not only a part of creation but a symbol for all of creationo 65 For 
all of the deceptiveness, cannibalism, and evil in the universe "the 
Albino Whale was the symbol." Ishmael says, "The White Whate swam before 
him as the monomaniac incarnation of all those malicious agencies which 
some deep men feel eating in them, till they are left living on with half 
a heart and half a lung" (p. 185). The whale became for Ahab a means of 
approaching that mysterious mover of the malevolent universe: 
All visible objects, man, are but as pasteboard masks. But 
in each event--in the living act, the undoubted deed--there, 
some unknown but still reasoning thing put forth the mouldings 
of its features from behind the unreasoning mask. If man will 
strike, strike through the mask! How can the prisoner reach 
outside except by thrusting through the wall? To me, the white 
whale is that wall, shoved near to me. Sometimes I think there's 
naught beyond. But 1tis enough. He tasks me; he heaps me; I see 
in him outrageous strength, with an inscrutable mali.ce sinewing 
it. That inscrutable thing is chiefly what I hate; and be the 
white whale agent, or be the white whale principal, I will wreak 
that hate upon him (p. 167). 
As Ahab found, however, the whale could not be destroyed: it was immortal. 
In his reaction to this fact we see the very essence of Ahab's philosophy, 
according to Bernstein. 66 For Ahab does not surrender even in certain 
defeat; he continues his futile struggle against the whale although it 
means his own final destruction. This attitude of stoic defiance is 
particularly important in this examination because we shall see it again 
in Pierre and in Mardi. It is more than an artistic tool used in Moby 
Dick; it is the attitude of Melville himself. In a chaotic, evil universe 
--devoid of any benevolent deity--Melville reacted just as Ahab did, with 
stoic defiance. 
Pierre provides a useful indication of Melville's philosophy 
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because it gives a vague parallel to Melville's life, as already 
mentioned. Many of the details and events in Pierre, according to 
Geoffrey Stone.in Melville, are "more or less equivalent to facts in 
Melville's own life and background. 1167 Certainly, the book is not a 
precise biography, but there is no doubt that Melville's general 
spiritual state is revealed. Most importantly, Pierre's conclusions 
seem to be the same as Melville's in many cases. As emphasized by Stone, 
Melville had adopted the verdict of Ahab--that there is a contradiction 
at the center of being--and now he puts this same verdict in Pierre. 
The whale and the fabulous world of Ahab are gone, but the same ambig-
uous universe is carried over into Pierre where it is discovered by an 
unhappy young man struggling against the practical problems of life. 
Both Ahab and Pierre, then, are alienated from the universe because of 
an outraged moral sense; they both found the world malignant.68 Pierre 
finds that truth in its very essence is contradictory, that an insoluble 
ambiguity is the very foundation of existence. Pierre seeks to solve 
the incredible problems he faces by a strict adherence to virtue and 
truth. ,In other words, he makes a strict application of the moral laws 
which are a part of orthodox religion. It is the utter failure of 
this attempt that disillusions him, that reveals the apathy of the 
universe and the ambiguity of truth and virtue. "Civilisation, Phil-
osophy, Ideal Virtue1 behold your victim," Melville cries.69 At the 
final moment of Pierre's awakening, Isabel speaks to him: 
'Tell me first what is Virtue:--begin1 1 
11f on that point the gods are dumb, shall a pigmy 
speak? Ask the air1 1 
'Then Virtue is nothing.' 
1Not that1 1 
'Then Vice?• 
'Look: a nothing is the substance, it casts one shadow 
one way, and another the other way; and these two shadows 
cast from one nothing; these seems to me, are Virtue and 
Vice.' 
'Then why torment thyself so, dearest Pierre?' 
'It is the law. 1 
1What7 1 
'That a nothing should torment a nothing; for I am a 
nothing. It is all a dream--we dream that we dreamed 
we dream' (pp. 381-2). 
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Pierre reaches the same conclusion as the waiter in Hemingway's "A 
Clean, Well-Lighted Place": all is nothingo In the end, Pierre finds 
that virtue and vice come out alike. The cold, indifferent universe 
has no concern about these trivial matters. When Pierre fully realizes 
the nature of the universe, he reacts much as Ahab had done. His 
response is suicide, a reaction different from Ahab.1 s, certainly, but 
like it also in its futile defiance of an overwhelming foe. 
After Pierre's disillusionment, he is well qualified to speak for 
Melville about the status of man in the universe. Just before the arrival 
of Lucy, he laments 
I own myself a brother of the clod, a child of the Primeval 
Gloom. Hopelessness and despair are over me, as pall on pall. 
Away, ye chattering apes of a sophomorean Spinoza and Plato, 
who once didst all but delude me that the night was day, and 
pain only a tickle. Explain this darkness, exorcise this devil, 
ye cannot. Tell me not, thou inconceivable coxcomb of a Goethe, 
that the universe cannot spare thee and thy innnortality, so long 
as--like a hired waiter--thou makest thyself 'generally useful.' 
Already the universe gets on without thee, and could still spare 
a million more of the same indentical kidney (p. 421). 
Cut off from his universe as he is, isolated from God on the one hand 
and nature on the other, man can only feel that he is a "clod." To 
isolate him is to deprive him of any meaning or purpose. Melville's 
isolation of man, to say the least, places man in a very lowly and 
degraded position. Moby Dick, Pierre, and, as will be seen, Mardi all 
ask questions, all search the universe for meaning, but there are no 
answers. In the end, connnents Hillway, "There is only ••• the conviction 
of human weakness which finds all truth ambiguous. 1170 In sharp contrast 
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to the old world-view in which man had a solid relation to his cosmos 
and a purpose because of that relationship, Melville's man is a helpless, 
impotent, "existential" man ••• whose every connection with the universe 
has been s~vered. In this, Melville joins Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and 
a good many other existentialists who, according to Ernst Breisach, 
"contributed to the gradual destruction of the overconfidence of modern 
man concerning the validity of what he knows and does.1171 Kafka, for 
instance, depicts man as thrown into an alien world and left to survive 
aloneo And his characters fail much as do Melville 1 s. 72 Heidegger 
also agrees with Melville, for, according to Breisach, a basic part of 
Heidegger's philosophy is that anxiety which "makes fiiaE_/ aware of his 
estrangement from Being, makes him feel completely threatened.11 73 
Melville clearly occupies a position on this matter closely akin to that 
of modern atheistic existentialism. 
Melville's Mardi is without a doubt the most detailed and straight-
forward explanation of his philosophy. Here the heavy veil of allegory 
that was to cover Moby Dick is missing (Mardi was written in 1849, two 
years before Moby Dick); indeed, Mardi is so direct at times it can hardly 
be called allegory. Mardi's allegory, of course, is given structure by 
Taji 1 s search throughout Mardian countries for his lost Yillah. Melville 
speaks allegorically of politics, religion, etc. through Taji's travels 
in Polynesian islands, representative of modern nations. That which is 
important here is that search itself, Taji 1 s long journey in search for 
his love. It seems likely that, as Stone comments, Yillah represents 
happiness, perfection. 74 She seems to represent truth, certainty, 
order--all that which Melville sought himself. Melville places Yillah 
before Taji as representation of that which all men seek but cannot 
obtain. And Taji searches unceasingly for her throughout land after 
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land. Finding her becomes a monomania for him almost like destroying 
the whale became for Ahab. Though dealing with the problem in different 
ways, comments Hillway, Ahab and Taji both face the same problem: 11 the 
search for a true explanation of man's relationship with God in the 
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universe." To find Yillah·will give Taji that truth, that knowledge 
,of God and the universe a But the search for her is futile, and as the 
futility bec'omes apparent, another solution presents itself: Serenia--
the serentiy of orthodox religious faith. Taji, however, rejects 
Serenia because of a mental struggle involving something like the 
traditional split between faith and reasono Taji rejects faith, remarks 
Stone, because he cannot reconcile it with reason. 76 Instead, Taji 
finally accepts the view that Babbalanja expresses--that there is an 
eternal contradiction at the heart of things. He continues to search, 
however, and just as for Ahab, the all-important search is frustrating. 
For both it leads to a futile, defiant deatho Taji continues to seek 
for Yillah, even though it means his death, because therein is his 
defiance; he defies a confused, irrational world that actually has no 
truth, no Yillah, to offer. 
In Taji 1 s defiance, as well as Ahab's, Melville has clearly 
expressed an attitude common to many of the later and better-known 
existentialists. Two of the central attitudes of existentialism, as 
listed by Dr .... Harry Campbell, are the ideas that the common lot of 
man is suffering and (2) the denial that man actually seeks happiness 
or well-being. Kierkegaard, explains Campbell, says that man would 
choose the freedom of the life of suffering even if he were given that 
choice. And Dostoevsky in "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor" and 
Notes from Underground exemplifies this viewpoint. He says in the latter 
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that "lam sure man will never renounce real suffering, that is, 
destruction and chaos. Why, after all, suffering is the sole origin of 
consciousness. 1177 And in the same book, "But I repeat for the 
hundredth time, there is one case, one only, when man may purposely, 
consciously, desire what is injurious to himself, what is stupid, very 
stupid--simply in order to have the right to desire for himself even 
what is very stupid and not to be bound by an obligation to desire 
only what is rational. 1178 Dostoevsky's statement is a perfect analysis 
of Taji's actions, for Taji 1 s defiance, his suicidal search, is a 
completely irrational, 11 stupid 11 act. But it does achieve one thing: 
it asserts his free will to choose that which is irrational; it asserts 
his independence from any rational explanation of his world (such as 
that offered by Serenia). He pursues his goal on to death because it 
cannot be obtained. And this defiant pursuit even includes an anxiety 
close to that of the systematic existentialists: he is followed 
throughout the search by the three sons of the slain leader who, explains 
Stone, are symbolic of the guilt or anxiety Taji feels over his choice. 
The anxiety, Stone continues, is the 
normal reaction of the humanmind ••• when the complete 
independence of the will is insisted upon. Guilt (or the 
sense of sin, or, in currently fashionable language, Angst) 
is the feeling in the individual that he stands outside of 
the order of things, that even his own sickness, however it 
may be in contradiction to the rest of the world, has an 
absolute claim to existenceJ9 
Taji, like Ahab, Pierre, and Melville himself, insists on finding a 
rational, coherent scheme in the universe (Yillah) but comes to grief 
because his insistence on the primacy of his own will makes that 
impossible. Taji rejects all organized, ready-made answers; he speaks 
for Melville in defying all logical schemes to order the universea If 
he offers any answer, it is defiance--the independence of the free 
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human spirito Near the end of Mardi Taji exclaims 
So, if after all thesefearful fainting traces, the verdict 
· be, the golden haven was not gained; yet on bold quest thereof, 
better to sink in boundless deeps, than float on vul§ar shoals: 
and give me, ye gods, an.utter wreck, if wreck I dp. O 
It has been observed in this examination that Melville does indeed 
have a number of the central characteristics that have come to be 
identified and systematized as "existential" in tq.e twentieth centuryo 
He occupies a prophetic post as he speaks of man and his universe, for 
in the early nineteenth century he- says what the existentialists were 
to repeat for the next century--that.man has no relation to his chaotic 
universe and that the only course of any merit is an assertion of the 
free human spirit.· I have attempted to better define Melville's 
existential position by a contrast with the world-view of the 
Elizabethan period and by a brief explanation of how the old view faded 
away--making Me_lville one of the first to deal with a world devoid of 
meaning and order. One final point remains to be emphasized, however. 
Obviously, existentialism takes_ its name from its central concern with 
human existence. And it is in this. respect that Melville finalizes 
his existential position. Melville's emphasis is on the 111, 11 the self: 
his ~onstant reference, in Stone's terms, is 11 to the experiencing agent." 
Melville insists that "no problem is solved if the solution does not 
reckon in the questioner to whom it is addressed.11 81 Melville, like 
Taji, insists.on having all on his own terms.oein reference to the 
self. Neither God, nature, nor science offers a solution~ only one 
guide remains~~the Sovereign Self. 
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